{"id":11197,"date":"2024-01-30T19:59:08","date_gmt":"2024-01-30T19:59:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.americanconference.com\/fcpa-dc\/?page_id=11197"},"modified":"2024-01-30T19:59:08","modified_gmt":"2024-01-30T19:59:08","slug":"practical-implications-of-the-department-of-justices-ma-safe-harbor-policy","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.americanconference.com\/fcpa-dc\/practical-implications-of-the-department-of-justices-ma-safe-harbor-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Practical Implications of the Department of Justice\u2019s M&A Safe Harbor Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"
\r\n

By Jaclyn Jaeger<\/p>\r\n

Tuesday, January 30, 2024<\/p>\r\n <\/div>\r\n\r\n

In early October 2023, Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Lisa Monaco announced a \u201cnew\u201d (but not new) Department of Justice (DoJ) policy intended to incentivize acquiring companies to voluntarily self-disclose criminal misconduct uncovered during a merger or acquisition. But it comes with a caveat that could have more of a chilling effect on self-disclosures than anything else.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Under the M&A Safe Harbor Policy, an acquiring company will receive a presumption of a declination where it \u201cpromptly and voluntarily\u201d discloses criminal misconduct uncovered within six months from the date of closing on a deal; cooperates with the DoJ\u2019s ensuing investigation; and engages in \u201crequisite, timely, and appropriate remediation, restitution, and disgorgement,\u201d DAG Monaco said in remarks<\/a> announcing the policy.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\u201cThe presence of aggravating factors at the acquired company will not impact in any way the acquiring company\u2019s ability to receive a declination,\u201d DAG Monaco added, and any misconduct disclosed \u201cwill not be factored into future recidivist analysis for the acquiring company.\u201d Acquired entities, too, may qualify for applicable benefits, \u201cincluding potentially a declination,\u201d absent aggravating factors, DAG Monaco said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

The safe harbor applies only to criminal conduct discovered in \u201cbona fide, arms-length M&A transactions,\u201d not to misconduct that otherwise is \u201crequired to be disclosed or already public or known to the Department. Nor will anything in this policy impact civil merger enforcement,\u201d DAG Monaco explained further.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Regarding the \u201cbona fide, arms-length\u201d M&A transaction language, the intent there could have just been to ensure that the DoJ \u201cpreserve its own prosecutorial discretion to say, \u2018This isn\u2019t the type of case or transaction we had in mind in terms of providing credit if you come forward and disclose,\u2019\u201d said Brian Benczkowski, former assistant AG for the Criminal Division and now a partner at Kirkland & Ellis.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\"\"<\/a> \r\n\r\n

Newly Restrictive Timeline<\/h5>\r\n\r\n

The safe harbor isn\u2019t so much a new policy as it is old wine in a new bottle. The DoJ formally established the presumption of a declination for acquiring companies in M&A deals in March 2019 within the revised Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Corporate Enforcement Policy<\/a>. That policy was superseded in January 2023 by the Criminal Division\u2019s revised Corporate and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Enforcement Policy<\/a>, which incorporated new language stating that acquiring companies that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct may be eligible for a declination, \u201ceven if aggravating circumstances existed as to the acquired entity.\u201d<\/p> \r\n\r\n

While the safe harbor is not new, the restrictive 180-day deadline for reporting misconduct is, which for many reasons could have a chilling effect on acquiring companies self-reporting misconduct. \u201c[T]he fact of the matter is most companies in the M&A context would rather just be analyzed and evaluated under the existing voluntary self-disclosure policy without regard to the M&A provisions because you don\u2019t have that six-month timeline,\u201d Benczkowski said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

He added that it often takes \u201cmuch longer\u201d than six months to find potential misconduct, investigate it at the level it needs to be investigated, and gain enough comfort to make an informed decision about whether to voluntarily self-disclose those findings to the DoJ. \u201cCandidly, that\u2019s a tall order,\u201d he said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Pre-deal Due Diligence<\/h5>\r\n\r\n

The go or no-go decision of an M&A deal requires a careful due diligence analysis, the speed and efficiency of which are dictated by many factors, including the complexity of the deal \u2013 for example, a competitive bidding process involving multiple bidders seeking to acquire the same company versus a private deal that involves a single buyer.<\/p> \r\n\r\n

\u201cThe most important thing is the risk assessment,\u201d said David Simon, a partner at Foley & Lardner. This requires triaging due diligence to focus on the highest-risk areas first.<\/p> \r\n\r\n

From a deal lawyer\u2019s perspective, the pre-acquisition and pre-close process encompasses not only legal and regulatory due diligence, but also financial due diligence, technology due diligence, supply chain due diligence, and more, Benczkowski stressed.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Practically speaking, to identify high-risk areas on the front end and focus on them at the outset, Simon recommended the following key measures: interviewing the heads of legal, compliance, and finance, and at times the company\u2019s business leaders in high-risk regions of the world; seeking out key documents and information; and getting an overall sense of whether the company has an effective and well-resourced compliance program. While less common, it may even be necessary to bring in a forensic accounting firm to do forensic transaction testing to uncover potential misconduct, he said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\"\"<\/a> \r\n\r\n

\u201cSuffice to say, pre-merger due diligence generally is not geared to the kind of searching examination of the wide swathe of federal crimes that could be implicated by the target\u2019s former business activities,\u201d said David Rybicki, a partner at K&L Gates and co-leader of the firm\u2019s White-Collar Defense and Investigations practice group. \u201cThe question will in many cases focus on how flexible DoJ is willing to be about the six-month window on either side of the deal.\u201d<\/p>\r\n\r\n

With or without a safe harbor, acquiring companies might decide it best to not to go through with a deal if misconduct is uncovered. \u201cIf the acquiring company flags a major, systemic FCPA problem, a lot of times the answer is, \u2018No thanks. We\u2019re not doing this deal,\u2019\u201d Simon said. Other times, the acquiring company might say, \u201c\u2018You need to clean this up with the Securities and Exchange Commission or DoJ before we close.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Post-deal Due Diligence<\/h5>\r\n\r\n

The new policy effectively establishes a higher bar for legal and compliance teams to meet. \u201cIn many cases, companies will need to dive much deeper in the pre-acquisition period\u2014something which many companies will be unwilling to do\u2014or work expeditiously in the post-deal context to integrate and examine the target\u2019s compliance function and operations to detect potential issues,\u201d Rybicki said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

In the post-deal context, it will be crucial for legal and compliance teams to undertake \u201cimmediate and aggressive\u201d implementation measures, Simon said. Especially with high-risk deals, the process of quickly integrating IT systems, policies and procedures, and internal controls can function like a risk-based audit, providing a good line of sight into where compliance problems could be, he said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Getting the heads of legal and compliance on-site to meet with the employees and management team of the newly acquired target and engaging in compliance questionnaires are other recommended steps.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Remediation Timeline<\/h5>\r\n\r\n

In cases where an acquiring company does uncover and self-disclose misconduct, the safe harbor affords acquiring companies one year to take remedial action. What the DoJ wants to see is that the company has done everything possible to make sure that whatever misconduct was disclosed won\u2019t occur again in the future, Benczkowski said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, remediation can take several forms. Common remediation measures include revising the company\u2019s internal policies and procedures and\/or code of business conduct; educating and training employees on those new policies and procedures; and sanctioning or terminating those responsible for the misconduct. \u201cDoJ now also wants to see that companies have denied wrongdoers bonuses or clawed back their compensation,\u201d Benczkowski said.<\/p> \r\n\r\n

Rybicki said the \u201cnightmare scenario\u201d is when a company decides to disclose, but for whatever reason the DoJ decides that it doesn\u2019t qualify for the safe harbor, such as if the remediation wasn\u2019t sufficient or timely. Even if the company does qualify for the safe harbor, another weighted factor to consider is the potential personal liability of company officers, he said.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\u201cThe bottom line is, even if a company tries to do everything right and voluntarily disclose, it might miss the deadline or otherwise fall short of DoJ\u2019s demands with respect to disclosure or remediation,\u201d concluded Rybicki. \u201cPractically speaking, I don\u2019t think it will meaningfully change the calculus companies already apply when considering self-disclosure, because so many open questions remain, and no track record has developed yet showing how the Department will actually treat these cases.\u201d<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n

For questions, concerns or more information about ACI Insights, please contact:<\/strong>
Chris Corbin
Associate Director of Marketing
American Conference Institute |<\/span> The Canadian Institute |<\/span> C5
E: c.corbin@americanconference.com<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"By Jaclyn Jaeger Tuesday, January 30, 2024 In early October 2023, Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Lisa Monaco announced a \u201cnew\u201d (but not new) Department of Justice (DoJ) policy intended to incentivize acquiring companies to voluntarily self-disclose criminal misconduct uncovered during a merger or acquisition. 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